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INTRODUCTION
The year 1991 will always be regarded as a historical turning point for
the Antarctic Continent. Not only did 1991 represent the thirtieth anni-
versary of the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty,' but it also came to
represent an acknowledgment of the importance of the protection of the
region's precious environment.2 In October 1991, representatives of the
thirty-nine member nations that signed the 1961 Antarctic Treaty3 final-
ized a diplomatic agreement for the comprehensive protection of the en-
vironment in Antarctica.4 The environmental Protocol promises to
ensure a fifty year moratorium on all mining and oil exploration in the
Antarctic region.5 In addition, the Protocol provides numerous meas-
ures and guidelines that are intended to protect the pristine and fragile
environment that is unique to Antarctica.
Despite this diplomatic achievement, flaws do exist. In the original
draft agreement, mining activities could only take place after the fifty
year mining ban expired; a majority approved amendment passed, in-
cluding a binding legal regime to regulate mineral activities and finally
1. Antarctic Treaty of 1959, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinaf-
ter Antarctic Treaty]. Under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, after the expiration
of the date of entry, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to
participate under Article IX can call a conference of all Contracting Parties to a review
of the operation of the Treaty. Id. art. XII, para. 2(a).
2. Alan Riding, Pact Bans Oil Exploration in Antarctica, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991,
at A3. "It's the first time that the international community has formally recognized the
finite nature of this planet." Id.
3. The nations are divided into two groups. The first group consists of the voting
members and is referred to as "Consultative Parties," which includes: Argentina, Austra-
lia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the Netherlands, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. The second group of nations are
regarded as "Contracting Parties." This group represents nations who have not agreed to
all the terms of the Treaty, and includes: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslova-
kia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, North Korea, South Korea, Papua New
Guinea, Peru, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. In November, 1990, Switzerland gained
observer status to the Treaty.
4. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties: Final Act of Eleventh Antarctic Treaty
Special Consultative Meeting and .the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty opened for signature, 30 I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Final
Act was signed by all Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and Contracting Parties iden-
tified in the first paragraph of the Final Act, plus Guatemala was also added as a Con-
tracting Party. On October 4, 1991, the Protocol was signed by representatives of the
following Consultative Parties: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ec-
uador, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Peru,
Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King-
dom, United States, and Uruguay. It was also signed by the following Contracting Par-
ties: Austria, Canada, Colombia, Greece, Hungary, South Korea, Romania, and
Switzerland.
5. Id. art. 7.
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ratification by three-fourths of the Antarctic Treaty voting nations, in-
cluding approval by all twenty-six current voting nations.6 Therefore,
the original draft would have provided any of the twenty-six Treaty
members with a powerful veto, which may have prevented an individual
nation from attempting to remove the mining ban well after the fifty year
expiration.' A rift emerged, however, as several Treaty nations at-
tempted to seek out other means to subject Antarctica for future mineral
activities before the fifty year moratorium would expire and to remove
any threat of a veto.8 Inevitably, this side prevailed and the overall im-
pact of the environmental Protocol was to be diminished.
This Note will examine how this new Protocol could affect the
Antarctic environment and the possible problems that may arise
throughout the fifty year period. Furthermore, the Note will explore the
Protocol's attempt to address the other environmental hazards that have
plagued the continent. While no prior mineral convention agreements
appear to be effective currently, the Treaty nations may incorporate as-
pects of these prior conventions into a future mineral agreement. Part I
of this Note discusses the steps that were taken to develop the new envi-
ronmental Protocol, and traces the early mining concerns that arose over
Antarctica. Part II describes the history of the Antarctic Treaty system.
Part III analyzes the possible emergence of a mineral resource conven-
tion, including the strengths and weaknesses of past proposals for such a
convention. Part IV reviews the environmental concerns that have been
raised regarding Antarctica and the importance of a moratorium on envi-
ronmentally harmful activity. Part V examines the new Protocol and its
various provisions, which ensure the protection of the Antarctic region.
Finally, this Note concludes that while the environmental Protocol is an
important and necessary development towards maintaining the delicate
ecology of the Antarctic, problems that must be addressed remain un-
solved. For Antarctica's protective regime to be complete, the Antarctic
Treaty members must begin working on a comprehensive minerals agree-
ment that will best protect the continent's environment, should the day
ever come that nations decide to tap Antarctica for its potential wealth.
I. BACKGROUND
Between 1982 and 1988, the Antarctic Treaty nations negotiated a
Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA).9 The agreement, however, has been criticized and has
fallen under a great deal of scrutiny, causing a number of nations to with-
6. See Delegates Express Disappoint Over New US Mining Proposal at Antarctica
Conference, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), June 18, 1991.
7. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Nov. 25,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter CRAMRA or the Convention].
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draw their support from the Convention.'0
The flip-side of the CRAMRA has been a proposal which would estab-
lish Antarctica as a nature reserve or world park," which would best
guarantee that Antarctica would be protected from environmental risk.'"
On November 16, 1990, the United States Congress signed into law a
mining and drilling ban that protects the Antarctic environment while
the Treaty members continue to fashion a comprehensive protocol for
the protection of Antarctica.' 3 The legislation initially had the support
from the Bush administration,"' but at the diplomatic meeting in Ma-
drid, the following year, the United States delegation proposed an incen-
tive that would allow for mining expeditions to commence before the fifty
year moratorium expired."' Under the United States proposal, a nation
could mine or drill for oil without the consent of all the twenty-six voting
members.' 6 The proposal was strongly criticized by other Treaty mem-
bers, as the Madrid meeting reached an impasse on the future of Antarc-
tica.' 7 On July 3, 1991, however, President Bush made a major
turnaround in policy when he announced that he would sign the fifty
year ban on mining in Antarctica and sign the international Protocol to
protect the seventh continent.'
8
10. See Australian PMAgainst Antarctic Mining, XINHUA (NEW CHINA) NEWS SER-
VICE, May 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. See also Deborah C.
Waller, Note, Death of a Treaty: The Decline and Fall of the Antarctic Minerals Conven-
tion, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 659-67 (1989) (Australia and France removed
their support from CRAMRA in 1989, and it was this departure in consensus that inevi-
tably sunk the Convention as an enforceable agreement).
11. Here also, Australia and France have been the most active in trying to convince
Treaty members to adopt the world park plan. See Colin Deihl, Antarctica: An Interna-
tional Laboratory, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 423, 444-46 (1991); Ellen S.
Tenenbaum, Note, A World Park in Antarctica: The Common Heritage of Mankind, 10
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 129 (1990).
12. World park proponents make the argument that guaranteeing that no party will
benefit from possible resources in Antarctica, would place a check on all members to
make sure that no other party benefit from the continent's potential riches. See infra
notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
13. Antarctic Protection Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (West Supp. 1991).
14. 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1840-41 (Nov. 16, 1991).
15. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
16. The United States would eventually get their way through the "walkaway" clause
in the Protocol, supra note 4, art. 25, para. 5(b), see infra notes 112-15; see also Paul
Hunt, Green Shield for the Ice Continent; Worldwide Pressure could Impose a 50-year
Mining Ban in Antarctica, THE INDEPENDENT, June 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currnt File.
17. Id.
18. President Bush failed to give a reason for this reversal in United States policy.
See U.S. Agrees to Sign New Antarctic Minerals Agreement, REUTERS, July 3, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Larry B. Stammer, Bush Alters Stand, OKs
Antarctic Mining Ban, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at A26; Malcolm W. Browne, U.S.
Agrees to Protect Minerals in Antarctica, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1991, at A5.
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II. REGULATION OF ANTARCTICA
A. Antarctic Treaty System
Despite the harsh realities of nature that the Antarctic region pos-
sesses, the continent has captured the interest of man since the late eight-
eenth century.19 When the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year
(IGY) was proclaimed,2" it was a significant step as nations curbed their
prior emphasis from exploration to a new policy of scientific discovery.2"
This shift in behavior resulted in the formation of the Antarctic Treaty.22
The Treaty is dedicated to preserving the region as a research station
with an emphasis on free scientific exchange.2 3 Furthermore, the original
members agreed that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes, 4 that it
be open to inspection of all areas,25 and to ban all nuclear waste and
nuclear explosions.26
19. At first, visitors to the continent were not pleased by their discovery. Captain
James Cook predicted that "the world will derive no benefit [from Antarctica]," in 1777.
DEBORAH SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE 7
(1985). Over a hundred years later, Robert Falcon Scott, upon arriving at the South Pole
wrote, "Great God! this is an awful place." Id. at 1. By 1820, however, British, Norwe-
gian, and American sealers had established a prosperous fur seal trade off the Antarctic
Peninsula. Most of the seal hunting occurred in the region north of the 60 degree south
latitude area. Id. at 7. The industry of skinning seals was so successful that by 1830 the
southern fur seal was nearly extinct. Id. Throughout the 1840s numerous expeditions
were conducted that lead to the discovery and charting of the Ross sea and the Great Ice
Barrier. Id. at 8-9. The 19th century saw the emergence of temporary settlements on the
Antarctic mainland to support the whaling industry. Douglas M. Zang, Note, Frozen in
Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 722, 724 (1991).
In addition, a number of expeditions were dispatched to Antarctica as the desire grew to
conquer the final continent on the planet. F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLI-
TICS 2-3 (1982).
20. The IGY was a cooperative international effort from July 1, 1957 to December
31, 1958 to increase the scientific understanding of the Earth and its environment. Dur-
ing the period much field activity occurred in Antarctica with 12 nations establishing 60
research stations. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 83.
21. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 16.
22. The twelve original signatories Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Ja-
pan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom, and the United States, implemented a number of discussions which resulted in
the International Conference on Antarctica, held in Washington, D.C., 1959. See
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1. The meeting lead to the formation of the Antarctic
Treaty. Id. Following the ratification by the twelve nations, the Treaty entered into force
on June 23, 1961. Id.
23. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, preamble. See Deihl, supra note 11 at 433.
24. The Treaty provides that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.
There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the estab-
lishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as
well as the testing of any type of weapon." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1.
25. "Each observer... shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or
all areas of Antarctica." Id. art. VII, para. 2. The Article also includes inspections of
"all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircrafts at
points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica." Id. art. VII,
para. 3.
26. "Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste
material shall be prohibited." Id. art. V, para. 1.
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The Antarctic Treaty has, since its inception, acted as both a govern-
ment and a legal regime for the continent.27 It has achieved a balance in
attempting to resolve some of the region's underlying political problems -
such as the rivalry among several nations with announced territorial
claims, 8 and political disputes that may have existed between the Treaty
members.29 The spirit of the Antarctic Treaty also has lead to the devel-
opment of other agreements between the members.3" In addition, nu-
merous recommendations have been adopted by the member nations.31
27. When originally proposed, the Treaty had somewhat narrow aspirations, focusing
mainly on the growth of scientific research in the 1950s. John J. Barcelo III, The Inter-
national Legal Regimefor Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155, 157 (1986). However,
as the years passed and the importance of the future potential of the continent was real-
ized, the Treaty became far more comprehensive, dealing with issues like sovereignty,
civil and criminal jurisdiction, conservation, military matters, and ownership of the re-
gion's minerals. See Zang, supra note 19, at 726-27.
28. During the 1950s, seven nations - Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zea-
land, and the United Kingdom - had claimed regions of Antarctica based on the legal
arguments of discovery, occupation, geographic proximity, and historic rights. See
SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 68. The British, Chilean, and Argentine claims overlapped
one another. Id. Throughout the same period, Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet
Union, and the United States were operating scientific stations on the continent, but re-
frained from making any territorial claims. Id. at 67-68, 78-82. In addition, these na-
tions refused to recognize the territorial claims made by the others. Id. at 77-82. Article
IV of the Treaty helped in easing the sovereignty issue by ignoring it. See Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV. The Article helped in achieving a cooling between the
claimants, non-claimants, the superpowers, and the developed and developing nations.
29. The biggest test for the Treaty's durability arose during the 1982 Falkland/
Malvinas war between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The war took the two na-
tions to the very border of the Antarctic demilitarized zone which starts at the area south
of the 60 degree South Latitude mark. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 17; see Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI. Argentina was especially careful in making it a point not to
cross the line and risk anger and dissent from the other Treaty members. SHAPLEY,
supra note 19, at 17.
30. See e.g., Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR), May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 19 I.L.M. 841 (entered into force April 7,
1982). The agreement supports an ecosystem method for the preservation and manage-
ment of living beings within the oceans surrounding Antarctica. It applies measures to
ensure that the harvesting of certain marine species, like finfish or krill, is done in a
manner which will not disrupt the ecological food chain for other dependent species.
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441,
11 I.L.M. 251 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978). The CCAS attempted to limit the
vulnerability of six seal species in the Antarctic region to commercial exploitation. The
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13, 1964, 17
U.S.T. 996, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802. The agreement outlines specific mechanisms to
ensure that any activity taken in the Antarctic region will not harmfully affect the area's
native plant life, birds, and mammals.
31. Since the ratification of the Treaty more than 160 recommendations have been
adopted by the members covering topics such as environmental issues, meteorology, tour-
ism, and telecommunications. Christopher C. Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Re-
gime, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 606 (1989). In addition, the new 50-year mining ban
includes new regulations for wildlife protection, waste disposal, and marine pollution.
See infra notes 105-44 and accompanying text.
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B. Early Mining Concerns
While no gold rush began when scientists in 1973 discovered traces of
hydrocarbons in Antarctica,32 the parties realized that a new hidden
wealth may lie under the sheets of ice. Treaty powers recognized that a
real find in Antarctica could potentially create great destabilization
within the region.33
Under the language of the Treaty, members are required to refrain
from actions that could endanger the Antarctic environment without ex-
tensive prior study.34 At the ninth consultative meeting in London in
1977, the Treaty powers adopted, in Recommendation IX-I on Antarctic
minerals, a policy referred to as "voluntary restraint., 35 The members
agreed to "urge their nationals and other States to refrain from all explo-
ration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while making pro-
gress towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime concerning
Antarctic mineral resource activities.",36 This agreement, however, did
not quash the desire for nations to study certain areas for potential eco-
nomic activity.37 Throughout the same period, the Treaty members ac-
knowledged that no clear mechanism for environmental protection
existed.3 8
III. MINERAL RESOURCE CONVENTION EMERGES
While the acceptance of a fifty year mining and drilling moratorium
for the Antarctic continent has apparently put the CRAMRA to rest, it
32. In 1973, gaseous hydrocarbons were discovered in three of the four holes drilled
in the Ross Sea continental shelf by the U.S. scientific drilling ship, the Glomar Chal-
lenger. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 124. The appearance of hydrocarbon gases does
not mean that commercial oil or gas deposits exist, as a result, the drilling expedition was
abandoned. Id.
33. At the time of the Glomar findings, the world was faced with a sudden rise in the
price of Middle Eastern oil. Nations began to look elsewhere for areas that could satisfy
their energy needs. After 1973, the potential of the presence of hydrocarbons in Antarc-
tica brought about political implications. The Treaty powers recognized that jurisdiction
had to be asserted over the development of extracting mineral resources since the Treaty
made no mention of it, and to protect the Antarctic environment from any sudden rush
to develop the region. Id. at 124-25.
34. "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activ-
ity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purpose of the permanent Treaty."
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. X.
35. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 139.
36. Id.
37. Despite the agreements, by the end of the decade, vessels of several nations were
making scientific surveys of the Antarctic continental shelf for possible off-shore oil ex-
ploration. Id. at 139-40.
38. In Norway, at the eighth consultative meeting, the members asked SCAR to as-
sess the environmental impact of exploration and exploitation on the continent. Id. at
140; see infra note 63 and accompanying text. At SCAR's fourteenth meeting in Argen-
tina in 1976, a group for the the Environmental Impact Assessment of Mineral Resource
Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica was established. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at
140.
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nonetheless, serves as an important lesson as to what a future mineral
convention may require. An extensive study of CRAMRA is not re-
quired, a brief overview of the Convention, a look to its strengths and
weaknesses and what, if any, of its provisions may be salvaged in a future
minerals convention, does deserve some examination.
A. Origin of CRAMRA
When CRAMRA made its appearance in 1982,"9 it represented an ef-
fort by the Antarctic Treaty members to reach needed solutions and
agreements regarding potential mineral exploitation.4" The Convention
consumed six years of negotiations, but was finally completed on June 2,
1988.41 Throughout the same period, the Parties reaffirmed their com-
mitment to the "voluntary restraint" policy in the Final Act of the
Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting on Antarctic
Mineral Resources.42
CRAMRA initially received the support of all the Consultative mem-
bers, but it nonetheless required the ratification of sixteen of the twenty
members.43 While the regime set up by CRAMRA does not contain a
detailed mining code, it does set down basic regulations for mineral ex-
ploitation, and at the same time, leaves the creation of more precise
guidelines to the new institutions which the Convention has enacted.'
B. Overview of CRAMRA
CRAMRA reflects the Parties' belief that the effective regulation of
Antarctic mineral resource activities will further the interest of the entire
international community.45 The preamble acknowledges that "Antarctic
mineral resource activities will adversely affect the Antarctic environ-
ment or dependent or associated ecosystems." '46 This recognition lead to
the Parties assertion that the "associated ecosystems must be a basic con-
39. CRAMRA, supra note 9.
40. This was partly due to the fact that the administration of a [mineral re-
source] regime of this type is more complex than that of fishery regimes or of
regimes for the conservation of living resources and implies greater institutional
demands, particularly in view of the fact that institutions will have important
powers and competence in dealing with the decision to authorize mineral activi-
ties, approve contracts, and supervise the political operation of the regime.
FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION: THE EMERGING
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 356 (1988).
41. CRAMRA, supra note 9.
42. See Deihl, supra note 11, at 439 n.127. The Final Act while continuing the policy
of voluntary restraint, goes further by prohibiting prospecting. Id.
43. CRAMRA, supra note 9, art. 63. The 16 members must include each of the
claimant states. Furthermore, at least five developing and 11 industrialized nations must
accept it. Id.
44. Deihl, supra note 11, at 439-40; see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
45. CRAMRA, supra note 9, preamble. See Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Ant-
arctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard the Door or Open the Door to Commercial
Exploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733, 742-44 (1990).
46. CRAMRA, supra note 9, preamble.
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sideration in decisions taken on possible Antarctic mineral resource
activities."4
CRAMRA established three administrative branches which include:
the Antarctic Mineral Resource Commission,48 the Antarctic Mineral
Resource Regulatory Committee,49 and the Scientific, Technical and En-
vironmental Advisory Committee.5" The three bodies were intended to
work together during the various stages of mineral discovery through the
exploitation process. 5 These governing branches attempted to create a
regulatory system that specifically established binding legal obligations
among the Parties and mandatory compliance during any and all stages
of possible mineral exploitation.52
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of CRAMRA
Proponents of CRAMRA argue its necessity on the basis that failure
to have any type of system would result in unacceptable environmental
risks.53 Since the language of the Antarctic Treaty does not prohibit
mining exploitation, some type of governing mechanism is needed to
keep the Parties in check.54 In addition, failure to agree on a uniform
system which has the consensus of the members may lead to a break-
down of the entire Treaty system.55
CRAMRA as a governing system would be the best guarantee to pre-
vent such consequences. One of CRAMRA's greatest strengths is that it
requires a consensus by the minerals regulatory regime for all Explora-
tion and Development Permits and attendant activities. 56 Such a re-
quirement strongly conveys to interested parties that only
environmentally sound proposals are going to be considered. This set-up
acts as a watchdog approach over all mineral resource activity. Further-
more, applying CRAMRA's regulations to commercial operators is
likely to make interested parties think twice before they decide to set up
shop in the region.57
47. Id.
48. Id. art. XVIII, para. 1.
49. Id. art. XXIX, para. 1.
50. Id. art. XXIII, para. 1.
51. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
52. See Davis, supra note 45, at 744.
53. Deihl, supra note 11, at 446.
54. The Treaty permits mineral exploitation activities so long as such activities are
consistent with the fundamental principles of the Treaty. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1,
art. X; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. Advocates of CRAMRA argue that in the absence of the Convention, not only
will unmonitored oil and mining exploration take place, but disputes over sovereignty
and claims on potential oil sites could arise, causing havoc to the entire Treaty process.
Deihl, supra note 11, at 446.
56. CRAMRA, supra note 9, art. XXII.
57. CRAMRA holds operators strictly liable for any damage to the Antarctic envi-
ronment or to its dependent or associated ecosystems. Id. art. I, para. 15. See id. art.
VIII, para. 2(a)-(d), and art. VIII, para. 5.
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The primary criticisms of CRAMRA revolve around the notion that it
represents more of a "miners charter"58 than an instrument that will in-
sure protection for the Antarctic environment. While the Convention
has environmental safeguards,59 it is possible that Treaty members will
not enforce them.' Antarctic Treaty members have unfortunately had a
poor history of enforcing environmental agreements when there has been
little, if any, pressure to develop Antarctica's mineral resources. When
and if oil or other valuable resources are discovered, it is likely that the
Parties will first try to fight over who is going to get their fair share and
leave the discussions for preserving the environment for later.
Another difficulty with CRAMRA lies in its provisions on liability. 61
In addition, CRAMRA includes a variety of ambiguous terms that will
only be interpreted when an actual crisis arises. 6 A valid fear exists that
ambiguous terms will be given ineffectual interpretations should there be
some type of oil discovery in the region and the Parties are overtaken by
a sense of gold fever.
58. During the CRAMRA negotiations various environmental groups, including
Greenpeace, the Cousteau Society, the Worldwide Fund for Nature, and the Antarctic
Southern Ocean Coalition, led an aggressive drive against CRAMRA to raise interna-
tional public awareness of threats to the Antarctic environment. They regarded
CRAMRA as a miners charter. See Hunt, supra note 16.
59. CRAMRA, supra note 9, art. IV, para. 2 states:
No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take place until it is judged, based
upon assessment of its possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and on
dependent and on associated ecosystems, that the activity in question would not
cause:
(a) significant adverse effects on air and water quality;
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine environments;
(c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of
populations of species of fauna and flora;
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of
such species; or
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, scientific,
historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance.
60. Throughout the history of the Antarctic Treaty, the member nations have tried to
avoid dissent among one another. Thus, it is arguable that if one party would ignore the
environmental Protocol, it is possible that other members would look the other way. J.R.
ROWLAND, The Treaty Regime and the Politics of the Consultative Parties, in THE
ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME at 14-15 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra eds.
1988).
61. Under the provisions of CRAMRA, a multinational corporation can choose
which nation will be its sponsoring state. Because the sponsoring state is responsible for
ensuring that an operator complies with CRAMRA's requirements, an operator may try
to choose those sponsoring states that interpret the Convention leniently. Developing
nations, eager to establish a foothold in Antarctica, may be inclined to pass lax rules to
attract operators. Deihl, supra note 11, at 453.
62. For example, under Article IV, no mineral activity is allowed if the activity will
cause significant adverse effects on air and water quality. Article IV also states that the
Comission should not make decisions about Antarctica mineral resource activities with-
out adequate information. Unfortunately, terms such as "significant," "adequate," and
"appropriate" are never defined. Instead, the parties are supposed to interpret the terms
if a conflict arises. Id.
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The potentially dangerous loopholes that CRAMRA was unable to
close are perhaps the greatest factors that lead to its demise. While
CRAMRA appears to have failed in its goal of providing a governing
regime that would establish regulations and operations for mineral re-
source activities on the Antarctic continent and surrounding region, it
does act as an important stepping stone for a future minerals convention.
Should the Treaty members one day decide to lift the moratorium, or
some Party walks away from its obligations under the Protocol, some
type of minerals resource regime will need to exist. The Treaty members
need only fill in the gaps that CRAMRA failed to provide for.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR ANTARCTICA
The Treaty members realized the importance of preserving the pristine
and relatively untouched region of the Antarctic environment by draw-
ing up protective measures long before such issues became an interna-
tional matter.63 Antarctica's importance to the planet has not yet been
fully understood. Only recently have scientists begun to realize the im-
portance of Antarctica's presence as a balancing force in the global envi-
ronment.' The surrounding waters off the continent are critically
important to the world's food chain. The Southern Ocean is home to the
63. For instance, the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) was estab-
lished. SCAR is composed of various members from nations who are actively participat-
ing in scientific research in Antarctica. In 1961, rules pertaining to the protection of the
Antarctic environment were drafted. They included: that flora and fauna not native to
Antarctica should not be introduced on the continent; pilots should not fly helicopters
too close to bird rookeries; firearms should not be detonated near colonies of seals; dogs
should not run free; and there should be no discharge of oil in any manner that hurts
plants and animals. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 105-06; see Christopher C. Joyner, The
Antarctic Legal Regime: An Introduction, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME, supra
note 60, at 5. Throughout the 1970's, the members strengthened their commitment to the
protection of Antarctica's environment, which included their declaration that "It]he Con-
sultative Parties recognise their prime responsibility for the protection of the Antarctic
environment from all forms of harmful human interference." SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at
108. The dedication of the Consultative Parties in attempting to meet the need of
Antarctic environmental protection, has not always been successful. There have been
reports on various environmental violations by the numerous scientific bases on the conti-
nent which continue to remain a threat. See, Laura Clarke, Pollution at Science Posts:
The Thrashing of Pristine Antarctica, S.F. CHRON., July 2, 1991, at Al. In addition, the
1989 oil spill of an Argentine tanker near the Antarctic Peninsula poured more than
200,000 gallons of diesel fuel and caused incalculable environmental harm. See generally,
Mary L. Canmann, Comment, Antarctic Oil Spills of 1989: A Review of the Application of
the Antarctic Treaty and the New Law of the Sea to the Antarctic Environment, 1 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. & POL'Y 211 (1990).
64. Antarctica offers scientists ideal opportunities to study global environmental
problems, including sea-level changes, global climate, and global levels of at-
mospheric constituents such as ozone ... Antarctica's isolation from the rest of
the planet, combined with the harsh climate, makes it relatively unaffected by
man. Therefore, it provides a base line for studies on global pollution of various
kinds.
Deihl, supra note 11, at 431.
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krill population. 65 All species residing in the Southern Ocean depend on
krill for their survival.66 A sudden decrease in krill population as a result
of an oil spill or other environmental catastrophe could lead to a decline
in the existence of krill-dependent animal life worldwide.67
While the new moratorium should put environmental groups at ease
for some time and allow governments and industry to develop environ-
mentally sound practices of mineral extraction, concerns still exist. Ant-
arctica's greatest environmental risk is that of oil development and
transport. The effect of an offshore oil spill in the region would be disas-
trous. "The lighter hydrocarbons in the oil would evaporate slowly while
the heavier ones sank, possibly coating the underside of the sea and pack
ice ... where many small organisms live.", 6' The transport of oil has
already proven to be an enormous environmental hazard.69 While oil
spills are one threat, inability to stop spills or implement clean-up opera-
tions are another.7° The failure to resolve these and other environmental
issues has already subjected the continent to environmental harm.7'
A. The World Park Plan
The risk of oil spills and other environmental threats led to the propo-
sal that Antarctica be established as a world park.7" The suggestion that
if nobody benefits, then we all benefit, is a strong argument for preserving
the Antarctic wilderness and its role as a scientific laboratory. The argu-
ments for the creation of a world park revolve around the notion that
65. Krill are a shrimp-like marine crustacean. Christopher C. Joyner, The Southern
Ocean and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165,
169 (1985). The CCAMLR regulates the harvesting of krill. See supra note 30 and ac-
companying text.
66. Deihl, supra note 11, at 432.
67. Joyner, supra note 65, at 174.
68. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 142.
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. "Mr. President, a small oil-spill from an Argentine tanker ... occurred 2 years
ago... and the oil is still spilling out. Nobody can get to it to fix it." 137 CONG. REC.
S8480 (daily ed. June 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gore).
71. A brief list of man's impact on the environment in the Antarctic region has in-
cluded the construction of a science base during the middle of a penguin breeding area,
the establishment of a base only 300 yards from the rookeries of eight bird species, the
dumping of garbage and the discharge of sewage into the surrounding seas. See F.M.
AUBURN, supra note 19, at 268-69.
72. The world park idea originated at the Second World Conference on National
Parks in 1972. Deihl, supra note 11, at 444. The participants unanimously agreed to
support Antarctica as an international park. Allan Young, Note, Antarctic Resources
Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
44, 65 n.103 (1985). The park would allow for the continued presence of scientific bases
and an Antarctic Environmental Protection Agency would be established to oversee all
types of human activity in the region. Deihl, supra note 11, at 444-45. The proposal was
only supported by a handful of groups, when in 1989, France and Australia announced
their support for the plan. John Lancaster, U.S.-Backed Antarctic Pact Criticized: Pros-
pecting Could Pave Way to Ecologocal Disaster, Opponents Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
1989, at A17. This decision lead to the subsequent demise of CRAMRA, because the
Convention required the support by the two nations. Deihi, supra note 11, at 445.
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mineral activities are incompatible with the principles of wilderness and
wildlife protection.73
The plan has run into criticism. The United Kingdom, one of the big-
gest critics of a world park establishment, recognized that "[i]f the eco-
nomic pressures came on and if the demand was there, the people would
simply brush the world park concept aside and you would have a free-
for-all in Antarctica which would destroy the environment for ever."74
In addition, proponents for the world park proposal have yet to offer a
detailed plan as to how the operation would be administered.75
V. THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL
A. Past Moratorium Proposals
It is quite possible that the Antarctic continent and its surrounding
area might have been zoned against all mining development forever if the
permanent moratorium, frequently discussed in 1973-75, had been
adopted by the Treaty members.76 As the thirtieth anniversary of the
Antarctic Treaty was approaching, the member nations realized that
some type of agreement with regard to Antarctica's future was going to
be decided. CRAMRA was nearly dead and some nations remained
hesitant to permanently proclaiming Antarctica as a world park. Shortly
before the thirty year expiration date of the Antarctic Treaty, nations
began to scramble in attempting to enact an environmental protocol
which would eventually lead to the fifty year mining moratorium.
B. Discussions Over a Moratorium
New proposals and initiatives for Antarctica's future emerged when
the government of New Zealand announced two steps to safeguard the
environmental protection of the continent. 77 The first step included pro-
viding a protocol for the various steps of different types of protection that
the continent required in regards to waste disposal, oil spills, the effects
of tourism, improved monitoring arrangements and environmental im-
pact assessment procedures. 78 The second step consisted of the establish-
73. See Tenenbaum, supra note 11, at 126.
74. Antarctica World Park Plan Rejected, PRESS Ass. NEWSFILE, April 19, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
75. Id.
76. During the eighth consultative meeting, held in Norway in 1975, a majority of the
Treaty powers seemed to favor a permenant moratorium. The Soviet Union was a major
sponsor of a morotorium, apparantly because they were hoping to catch up with other
industrialized powers in developing new oil drilling technology. The United States, how-
ever, stood practically alone in opposing a morartorium. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 160.
The failure to reach a complete consensus, however, left the Parties with their original
1972 recommendation of voluntary restraint. Id.
77. New Initiatives by New Zealand on Antarctic Environmental Protection, XINHUA
(NEW CHINA) NEWS SERVICE, July 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File.
78. Id.
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ment of a long-term, legally binding moratorium for Antarctica.7 9
Throughout the same period, the United States legislature was also
working on the Antarctic Protection Act of 1990.8" The Act supports
the proposal of a ban on mineral activity in Antarctica,8' and the
message that strong environmental protection for the continent be pre-
served.82 In addition, the language of the Act demonstrates that the
United States Congress has rejected CRAMRA.83 During the drafting of
the Act, the House and the Senate cautioned that CRAMRA, or a re-
vised version of it, would not satisfy the provisions of the Act. 4
The power of the Act is found in Section IV. This section makes it
"unlawful for any person to engage in, finance, or otherwise knowingly
provide assistance to any Antarctic mineral resource activity.""5 The
Act recognized that the ban would stay in effect until a new agreement
could be negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. The
resulting agreement would provide an indefinite ban on Antarctic min-
eral resource activities until that agreement received approval through
Senate ratification. 6 Furthermore, through the section Congress is de-
claring that the position of the United States is currently against the de-
velopment of a mineral regime in Antarctica, and that it is in support of
an indefinite ban for all nations on Antarctic mineral resource
79. Id.
80. Antarctic Protection Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (West Supp. 1991).
81. Id. § 2(b) para. 2 "prohibit prospecting, exploration, and development of
Antarctic mineral resources by United States citizens and other persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States."
82. Id. § 2(b) para. 1, the purpose of the Act is to "strengthen substantially overall
environmental protection of Antarctica."
83. Id. § 2(a) para. 5 "[CRAMRA] does not guarantee the preservation of the fragile
environment of Antarctica and could actually stimulate movement toward Antarctic
mineral resource activity."
84. One of the most important findings in [§ 2, para. 5 of the Antarctic Protec-
tion Act] ... essentially says that ... CRAMRA is unacceptable as an interna-
tional framework to guarantee environmental protection of Antarctica. In
effect, the Congress is rejecting CRAMRA, and supporting a new agreement
which provides permanent, long-term protection for Antarctica. Some have ar-
gued that CRAMRA provides environmental protection and includes an indefi-
nite ban on mineral activity. The Congress has rejected this argument ...
because CRAMRA could ultimately lead to the commercial exploitation of the
continent. CRAMRA provides a mechanism for Antarctic mineral resource
development, and any agreement with such a mechanism is inconsistent with
the findings, purpose, and provisions of this legislation. Complete and perma-
nent protection from the ravages of commercial development can only be guar-
anteed if we reject the idea of mineral development, not provide for its
possibility, or facilitate its existence.
136 CONG. REC. H 12987, H12988-89 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Conte).
85. Antarctic Protection Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (West Supp. 1991).
86. Pending a new agreement among the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties
in force for the United States, to which the Senate has given advice and consent
or which is authorized by further legislation by the Congress, which provides an
indefinate ban on Antarctic mineral resource activities, it is unlawful for any
person to engage in, finance, or otherwise knowingly provide assistance to any
Antarctic mineral resource activity.
Id. § 4.
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activities. s7
Following the Act, a joint resolution was signed by Congress calling
for the United States to encourage immediate negotiations toward a new
agreement among the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the full
protection of Antarctica as a global ecological commons.8 8 On Novem-
ber 16, 1990, the Act was signed into law.89 In November, 1990, in Vifia
del Mar, Chile, the Treaty members met to discuss the issue of an envi-
ronmental accord that would best preserve Antarctica.9° The confer-
ence, however, failed to achieve its goals of reaching an agreement on
environmental impact assessment procedures, as a clear rift developed as
to what direction Antarctica's future was to go.9'
The negotiations did, however, resolve two important matters. First,
the majority of member nations acknowledged that CRAMRA had no
room in Antarctica's future and was not a viable alternative in its present
form.92 Secondly, the members agreed that a major collective decision
needed to be approved that would protect the environmental needs of the
continent.93 In addition, the opening session marked the recognition and
granting of observer status to the Antarctic Ocean and Southern Ocean
Coalition (ASOC).94 Finally, Switzerland became the Treaty's thirty-
ninth member with observer status, while the Netherlands and Ecuador
became full consultative parties. 95
87. Id.
88. Antarctic Treaty - Global Ecological Commons, Pub. L. No. 101-620, 104 Stat.
3340 (1990).
89. Upon agreeing with the Act's provisions, President Bush wrote:
The Antarctic continent is a vast, unspoiled land whose associated and depen-
dent ecosystems provide habitat for many unique species of wildlife and a natu-
ral laboratory from which to monitor critical aspects of stratospheric ozone
depletion and global climate change. There is a need to better protect Antarc-
tica's fragile environment by concluding a new environmental protection agree-
ment to supplement the existing protections provided by the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959 ... I am signing the legislation because it was amended in a manner
that can be considered consistent with my Administration's position on
Antarctic issues. This position includes advocacy of a strong environmental
protection agreement to supplement the Antarctic Treaty.
See 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1840-41 (Nov. 16, 1990).
90. See Hunt, supra note 16.
91. The environmental impact assessment procedure is a process under which all
human activity in Antarctica must be assessed before it proceeds. Id.
92. France, Australia, and New Zealand, backed by Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and Sweden supported a permanent ban, while the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Norway believed a binding moratorium on mining, followed by a regulatory
framework, would be better suited to protect Antarctica. Delegations from Spain and
Denmark supported a protocol agreement rather than a convention, so long as it banned
mining permanently, because it would be faster to negotiate and involve less bureaucracy.
Japan stood alone at the conference in its continued support for CRAMRA. Id.
93. Anthony Boadle, Antarctic Nations Negotiate Environmental Protection Accord,
REUTERS, Nov. 20, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
94. ASOC is an umbrella organization consisting of 200 environmental groups from
35 nations. Id.
95. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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C. Overcoming the Impasse
In April 1991, with the split on a permanent mining ban still un-
resolved, the Treaty members held a conference in Madrid, Spain, at-
tempting to heal the rifts before the thirtieth anniversary signing of the
Treaty.96 During that period a few important changes took place. First,
the United Kingdom made a significant move away from the support for
a mineral convention.97 Secondly, Japan shifted its policy of preserving a
mining option to a proposal for an indefinite moratorium. 9 Finally,
United States delegates' failure to support an extensive moratorium
brought about congressional dissent.99
96. State Department Says Priority in Meeting on Antarctica to Heal Split Over Min-
ing, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), March 6, 1991.
97. Foreign Minister Garel-Jones stated "[wie now believe that consensus may be
achieved through a moratorium. Such a moratorium would give the international com-
munity time to establish the necessary measure to avoid a legal vacuum on minerals once
a moratorium comes to an end." Britain Declares Support on Mining in Antarctica in
Major Policy Shift, Int'l Envtl. Rep. Daily (BNA), April 10, 1991.
98. The Japanese government recognized that CRAMRA provided adequate safe-
guards for the environment of the Antarctic wilderness but changed its position to
achieve a consensus. Stephen Brown, Japanese Switch on Antarctic Could Make Consen-
sus Easier, REUTERS, April 23, 1991, avaialble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
99. The Bush Administration advised its negotiators to support a ban on mining that
would last only 20 to 40 years. However, these figures were unacceptable for certain
members of Congress. "Our law calls on the Secretary of State to negotiate a new agree-
ment for Antarctica that would 'prohibit or ban indefinitely' mining activities ... 20 to 40
years does not constitute an indefinite ban." 137 CONG. REC. S4374, S4375 (daily ed.
April 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kerry). The dissent was highlighted in a letter signed
by various senators on March 25, 1991, that was sent to President Bush. It read as
follows:
Dear Mr. President: We are writing to express our grave concern that the pres-
ervation and protection of the Antarctic environment, that we worked hard to
ensure in the last Congress, is still at issue. Specifically, it is our understanding
that the United States, in the upcoming meeting of the Antarctic Treaty Parties
in Madrid, Spain will encourage other nations to agree to a policy that would
ultimately facilitate and encourage mining activities in the area.
On November 16, 1990, you signed into law two measures, Public Laws 101-
594 and -620, that declare it to be the policy of the United States to pursue an
indefinite prohibition of commercial minerals development and related activities
in Antarctica. We understand, however, that US representatives are instructed
to urge that mining merely be prevented for a limited time - some 20 to 40 years
- after which time the moratorium will be lifted. This position falls short of the
standard we believe should apply. A prohibition which ends after a time cer-
tainly does not amount to an indefinite ban.
Moreover, it is also our understanding that the United States is prepared to
suggest that [CRAMRA] be implemented when the mining prohibition is lifted.
As was declared in both of the measures mentioned above, however, CRAMRA
does not guarantee the preservation of the fragile environment of Antarctica
and could actually stimulate movement toward Antarctic mineral resource ac-
tivity.
The draft Protocol on Environmental Protection that was negotiated by the
Antarctic Treaty Parties in Chile in November of last year includes an incom-
plete article prohibiting mineral activities. It is our position that, in accord with
the legislation passed last year and with the operation of the Antarctic Treaty
System, the prohibition should be sustainable indefinitely, unless, through the
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At the Madrid conference, however, the United States delegation de-
cided to adopt the fifty year moratorium along with the other Treaty
members."°° The impasse arose when the United States proposed an al-
ternative method to the draft protocol that would allow mining and oil
drilling after fifty years without the consent of all twenty-six consultative
parties of the treaty.'" The United States delegation argued that under
the terms of the original draft protocol, there would be virtually no
chance that a ban could be lifted after fifty years, even if the majority of
nations agreed to lifting the moratorium. Under the alternative draft
Protocol, one nation acting alone could block the goals of the rest.
Despite the counter-proposals and arguments that arose following the
Madrid conference, the Bush Administration, on July 3, 1991, reversed
its position and agreed that it would accept the fifty year mining morato-
operation of very carefully designed procedures, a consensus is reached among
the Treaty Parties to modify its terms.
We realize the press of business, but the protection of the Antarctic is a duty
not only to this, but to all future generations. If we work together, we are
confident that an agreement can be negotiated and ratified that will effectively
protect Antarctica's pristine environment.
Sincerely,
Senators Richard Lugar, Brock Adams, Thomas Daschle, James Jeffords,
Quentin Burdick, Edward Kennedy, Joseph Biden, John Kerry, Al Gore, Carl
Levin, Bill Bradley, Alan Cranston, Daniel Akaka, Joseph Lieberman, Tom
Harkin, and Tim Wirth.
137 CONG. REC. S5066-5067 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gore).
100. The Treaty members reached an agreement on the 50-year mining ban. However,
the largest obstacle at the meeting was the draft protocol's Article 6 (now Article 7 of the
Protocol) dealing with a complete minerals ban. Argentina, the United Kingdom, and
the United States wanted to keep the minerals option open. The delegation set another
meeting for mid-June to finalize the Protocol. Tentative Agreement Reached on 50-year
Mining, Drilling Ban in Antarctica, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), May 1, 1991. Dur-
ing the same period, the United States proposed a resolution to remind the administration
of the support that exists in Congress for a long-term indefinite ban on mining and a more
comprehensive shield over the continent. 137 CONG. REC. S6759 (daily ed. May 24,
1991) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
101. The United States proposed to amend the draft protocol so that it, or any other
nation, could start mining thereafter even if some of the present 26 consultative members
were against lifting the ban. This amendment would remove the power of the veto; and
therefore, weaken the environmental Protocol. See Hunt, supra note 16. The United
States proposal also stated that if the majority-approved amendment proposal to allow
mining does not enter into force within three years of being submitted to all voting na-
tions for approval, then any voting nation may give notice of its withdrawal from the
mining prohibition. Mining would then be allowed to commence two years after formal
notification of withdrawal. Delegates Express Disappoint Over New US. Mining Proposal
at Antarctica Conference, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), June 18, 1991. The proposal was
received with criticism by the United States Senate:
Everybody in the world agreed [for the moratorium]. The Congress agreed.
We passed legislature ... I cannot understand why the President would sud-
denly reverse direction and say we disagree with the unanimous vote of the
House, unanimous vote of the Senate, and unanimous conclusion of every other
nation in the world.
137 CONG. REC. S8480, S8481 (daily ed. June 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gore).
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rium and sign the environmental Protocol."0 2 The switch in decision was
more than likely a direct result from the amount of worldwide criticism
and opposition that the Bush Administration received for their refusal to
adopt the mining ban."13
D. Analysis of the Protocol
On October 4, 1991, the Antarctic Treaty was renewed.Y04 The biggest
alteration to it being the new environmental Protocol which now in-
cludes the fifty year mining moratorium. 05 The preamble of the Proto-
col broadly defines the intent that exists within the agreement. 10 6 In
affirming the goals of the Antarctic Treaty, the preamble recognizes the
need for the environmental protection of the continent 10 7 and that the
preservation of Antarctica is in the interest of the entire global commu-
nity. 0 s The Protocol's objective is the commitment by the Parties to
protect the Antarctic environment and its ecosystems by designating the
continent as a natural reserve, devoted to peaceful uses and science. 10 9
The conducting of operations in the Antarctic region will now be subject
to strict supervision and various factors will be taken into account as to
whether the activity should be permitted at all." 0
Perhaps the most important article in the Protocol, is Article 7, which
102. President Bush gave no specific reason for the sudden shift in policy. Larry B.
Stammer, Bush Alters Stand, OKs Antarctic Mining Ban, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at
A26.
103. Letters of representatives from Japan, the European Community, the Soviet
Union, and Australia wrote to Bush urging him to support the draft Protocol. Id.
104. 31 Nations Sign Pact to Protect Antarctica, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at All;
Riding, supra note 2.
105. In addition to the Protocol, there are four Annexes to the Protocol, which form
an integral part thereof, namely: Annex I which deals with Environmental Impact As-
sessment; Annex II covers the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora; Annex III
discusses Waste Disposal and Waste Management; and finally, Annex IV targets the pre-
vention of Marine Pollution. The Protocol is intended to supplement the Antarctic
Treaty, but does not intend to modify or amend the provisions of the Treaty. Protocol,
supra note 4, art. 4, para. 1. In addition, nothing in the Protocol shall waive rights and
duties of the Parties to this Protocol under the other international instruments in force
with the Antarctic Treaty system. Id. art. 4, para. 2; see id. art. 5.
106. Protocol, supra note 4, preamble.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. art. 2. In addition, the importance of the Antarctic environment is recog-
nized. Id. art. 3, para. 1. Specifically, it states:
The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated eco-
systems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and aes-
thetic values, and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific research, in
particular research essential to understanding the global environment, shall be
fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in the
Antarctic Treaty area.
110. Id. art. 3, para. 2(b). This specifically states that:
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prohibits the use of mineral resource activities in the region. 1' While
the language signals the death-blow to CRAMRA, the article is also the
weak link of the entire Protocol. Under Article 25, in the section dealing
with modification or amendments to the Protocol, exists a "walkaway"
clause. 2  The clause would allow any signatory nation to withdraw
from the mining moratorium agreement completely, after giving five
years notice.11 3 While all other articles of the Protocol are subject to
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by seventy-five percent of
the Parties, 1 4 Article 7 is specifically designed to allow Parties to get out
of their commitments after the necessary notice is given.' Such an
amendment, if enforced, could render the entire mining and drilling mor-
atorium moot in a few years.
Article 8 discusses the environmental impact assessment plan, and the
methods of implementation are detailed in Annex I of the Protocol. All
activity which may affect the region is identified within three categories:
(a) less than a minor or transitory impact; (b) a minor or transitory im-
pact; or (c) more than a minor or transitory impact." 6 All activity in the
Activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as to
avoid:
(i) adverse effects on climate or weather patterns;
(ii) significant adverse effects on air or water quality;
(iii) significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic),
glacial or marine environments;
(iv) detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of
species or populations of species of fauna or flora;(v) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of
such species; or(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological, scientific, his-
toric, aesthetic or wilderness significance.
111. Id. art. 7. Specifically, Article seven holds that: "Any activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited."
112. Id. art. 25, para. 5(a). This paragraph states that:
With respect to Article 7, the prohibition on Antarctic mineral resource activi-
ties contained therein shall continue unless there is in force a binding legal re-
gime on Antarctic mineral resource activities that includes an agreed means for
determining whether, and, if so, under which conditions, any such activities
would be acceptable. This regime shall fully safeguard the interests of all States
referred to in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and apply the principles
thereof. Therefore, if a modification or amendment to Article 7 is proposed at a
Review Conference referred to in paragraph 2 above, it shall include such a
binding legal regime.
113. Id. art. 25, para. 5(b). This paragraph states:
If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force within 3
years of the date of its adoption, any Party may at any time thereafter notify to
the Depository of its withdrawal from this Protocol, and such withdrawal shall
take effect 2 years after receipt of the notification by the Depositary.
114. Id. art. 25, para. 3; see id. art. 25, para. 4.
115. The "walkaway" clause was developed at the insistence of the conservatives who
run the Economic Bureau of the State Department. See Jon Bowermaster, Hands Off
This Pristine Continent, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1991, at A26.
116. Protocol, supra note 4, annex I, art. 1, para. 2. If an activity is determined as
having less than a minor or transitory impact, the activity may proceed forthwith. Id.
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region will require that an Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) be
prepared.1 7 The IEE is required to contain sufficient detail of the type
of proposed activity, 1 " consideration of alternatives to the plan, and pos-
sible impacts that the proposed activity may bring about.' 19
The new Protocol also establishes the Committee for Environmental
Protection (CEP).' 2° Article 12 details the various functions that the
CEP will oversee and perform.121 In addition, the CEP will work with
other various scientific, technical, and environmental organizations in
carrying out its functions. 122  Under Annex II of the Protocol, which
deals with the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, the Parties
attempted to take direct action against harmful interferences that may
directly affect the continent.
Permits will be required for either the taking of or harmful interfer-
ence with native fauna and flora.' 23 The permits are required to specify
the authorized activity detailing when, where, and by whom such activi-
117. Id. art. 2, para. 1. Specifically, it states that: "Unless it has been determined that
an activity will have less than a minor or transitory impact, or unless a Comprehensive
Environmental Evaluation is being prepared in accordance with Article 3, an IEE shall
be prepared." The information is then to be compiled in a Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Evaluation and made public to the other Parties for their review. Id. art. 3, para. 3;
see id. art. 3, para. 5-6.
118. Id. art. 2, para. 1(a). The IEE will include: "a description of the proposed activ-
ity, including its purpose, location, duration, and intensity."
119. Id. art. 2, para. l(b).
120. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 11, para. 1. Each party is allowed to be a member of
the CEP and appoint a representative who may be accompanied by experts and advisors.
Id. art. 11, para. 2. In addition, observer status is open to any Contracting Party to the
Antarctic Treaty who may not be a member to the Protocol. Id. art. 11, para. 3.
121. Id. art. 12, para. 1. Specifically, the CEP's prime responsibilities will be to pro-
vide advice on the following:
(a) the effectiveness of measures taken pursuant to this Protocol;
(b) the need to update, strengthen or otherwise improve such measures;
(c) the need for additional measures, including the need for additional An-
nexes; where appropriate;
(d) the application and implementation of the environmental impact assess-
ment procedures set out in Article 8 and Annex I;
(e) means of minimising or mitigating environmental impacts of activities in
the Antarctic Treaty area;
(f) procedures for situations requiring urgent action, including response ac-
tion in environmental emergencies;
(g) the operation and further elaboration of the Antarctic Protected Area
system;
(h) inspection procedures, including formats for inspection reports and
checklists for the conduct of inspections;
(i) the collection, archiving, exchange and evaluation of information related
to environmental protection;
(j) the state of the Antarctic environment; and
(k) the need for scientific research, including environmental monitoring, re-
lated to the implementation of this Protocol.
122. Id. art. 12, para. 2. In ensuring that the provisions of the Protocol are being
fulfilled and in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, inspections by ob-
servers will be conducted. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
123. Protocol, supra note 4, annex II, art. 3, para. 1.
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ties are to be conducted.' 24 In addition, the permits are to be limited and
issued only for certain activities.125 The Parties believed that the limited
circumstances for which permits would be granted would help in ensur-
ing that no more native mammals, birds, or plants are taken than are
necessary to fulfill the goals of the Annex. 126 Animals and plants which
are not native to the region shall not be permitted in the Antarctic Treaty
area without first securing a permit, 127 and dogs, which have been a fix-
ture of past and present Antarctic expeditions, will no longer be able to
reside in the area.
128
Annex III covers the growing problems of waste disposal and waste
management that have plagued the Antarctic region for an extensive pe-
riod of time.'29 The language promotes a movement which will attempt
to minimize wastes produced and disposed of as far as is practically pos-
sible so as to guarantee that the Treaty area is as little affected as possi-
ble. 3o The Annex details which wastes will have to be removed from the
Treaty area, 13' and which types of waste will be subject to incineration or
124. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
125. Id. Permits shall be issued only for these few exceptions:
(a) to provide specimens for scientific study or scientific information;
(b) to provide specimens for museums, herbaria, zoological and botanical
gardens, or other educational or cultural institutions or uses; and
(c) to provide for unavoidable consequences of scientific activities not other-
wise authorized under sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) above, or of the construction of
scientific support facilities.
126. Id. art. 3, para. 3. In addition, all the Fur Seal and Ross Seal species are regarded
as "Specially Protected Species" and the granting of permits to take such species will be
limited to only a few narrow exceptions. Id. art. 3, para. 5. See id. app. A.
127. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
128. "Dogs shall not be introduced onto land or ice shelves and dogs currently in those
areas shall be removed by April 1, 1994." Id. art. 4, para. 2.
129. Protocol, supra note 4, annex III, art. 1, para. 1.
130. Id. art. 1, para. 2. Wastes removed from the Treaty area shall be returned to the
countries from which the generated waste came from or to another country if other ar-
rangements have been made. Id. art. 1, para. 4.
131. Id. art. 2, para. 1. These wastes include:
(a) radio-active materials;
(b) electrical batteries;
(c) fuel, both liquid and solid;
(d) wastes containing harmful levels of heavy metals or acutely toxic or
harmful persistent compounds;
(e) poly-vinyl chloride (PVC), polyurethane foam, polystyrene foam, rubber
and lubricating oils, treated timbers and other products which contain additives
that could produce harmful emissions if incinerated;
(f) all other plastic wastes, except low density polyethylene containers (such
as bags for storing wastes), provided that such containers shall be incinerated in
accordance with Article 3 (1);
(g) fuel drums; and
(h) other solid, non combustible wastes:
provided that the obligation to remove drums and solid non-combustible
wastes contained in subparagraphs (g) and (h) above shall not apply in circum-
stances where the removal of such wastes by any practical option would result
in greater adverse environmental impact than leaving them in their existing
locations.
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other disposal methods.' 32 In addition, one of the Annex's greatest ini-
tiatives is the phasing out of this procedure by no later than the end of
the 1998/1999 season.' 33 The disposal of wastes into the sea is still per-
mitted under Annex III,134 but now the Parties are required to limit pos-
sible environmental risks by discharging wastes in conditions where there
is initial dilution and rapid water dispersal.' 35 Perhaps the most mean-
ingful strategy in curtailing waste disposal that Annex III sets out, is
waste management planning. 36
Finally, Annex IV to the Protocol covers the prevention of marine
pollution in the Treaty area. Annex IV has a broad application, and its
provisions apply to all Parties' ships 37 which are entitled to fly their
respective flags and to any other ship which has interests in supporting
Antarctic operations while present in the Treaty area. 3 s All ships oper-
ating in the Treaty area will be required to "retain on board all sludge,
dirty ballast, tank washing waters and other oily residues and mixtures
which may not be discharged into the sea."' 3 9  The Annex also deals
In addition, liquid wastes, sewage, and domestic liquid wastes shall to the maximum
extent practicable be removed from the Treaty area. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
132. Id. art. 2, para. 3. Unless incinerated, autoclaved or otherwise rendered sterile,
the following objects will be removed from the Treaty area:
(a) residues of carcasses of imported animals;
(b) laboratory culture of micro-organisms and plant pathogens; and
(c) introduced avian products.
In addition, items such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), non-sterile soil, polystyrene
beads, chips or similar forms of packaging, or pesticides (other than those required for
scientific, medical, or hygiene purposes) are now prohibited from entering the region. Id.
art. 7.
133. Protocol, supra note 4, annex III, art. 3, para. 2. Until that time though, Parties
are to reduce open burning to the maximum extent practicable. Id.
134. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
135. Id. art. 5, para. l(a). The article also adds that large quantities of waste (gener-
ated in stations where the weekly occupancy during the austral summer is 30 individuals
or more) shall be treated by maceration. Id. art. 5, para. l(b).
136. Id. art. 8, para. 1. Under the provisions established, each Party which conducts
activities in the Treaty areas will be required to establish a waste disposal classification
system as a basis for recording wastes disposed of and to aid in evaluating the environ-
mental impact of such conduct. Id. The Parties will be required to appoint a waste
management official to implement and monitor the waste management plans. Id. art.
10(a). Each Party will be required to annually report and update their waste manage-
ment plans, detailing programs for cleaning up existing waste disposal areas. Id. art. 9.
These reports will be sent to the CEP where they will be subject to review and approval.
Id. art. 9, para. 3-4.
137. Protocol, supra note 4, annex IV, art. l(g) defines "ship" as: "a vessel of any type
whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cush-
ion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms."
138. Id. art. 2. Note that annex IV does not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or
other ship owned or operated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government
non-commercial service. Id. art. 11, para. 1. However, the Parties are required to at-
tempt to abide as reasonably as possible to the provisions set out by annex IV. Id.
139. Id. art. 3, para. 1. Discharges will only be permitted once the ships are outside of
the Treaty area. Id. The prohibition of oil discharges does not however, apply in in-
stances where there has been damage to a ship. Id. art. 3, para. 2(a). Furthermore, if
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with the disposal of garbage," and sets out a detailed list of items which
may no longer be dumped into the seas of the Treaty area. 141 Preventive
measures, emergency preparedness, and response actions are now re-
quired by Annex IV. 142 Contingency plans are to be prepared in order to
prevent any possible accidents that may arise in the Treaty area, possibly
affecting marine pollution. 143 Greater emphasis is placed on plans in-
volving "ships carrying oil as cargo, and for oil spills, originating from
coastal installations, which enter into the marine environment.' 44
E. Will the Protocol Work?
While the Parties to the Protocol are all entitled to celebrate their dip-
lomatic achievement of protecting Antarctica's precious environment, a
great number of questions persist over just how effective the Protocol and
its mining moratorium will be. 145 Many nations, some of whom are Par-
ties to the Protocol, along with others who are not, are still eager to
explore for the possible wealth that may lie beneath Antarctica's icecap
and along its extensive coastline. 46
A major weakness in the Protocol is that it fails to provide a legal
mechanism to prevent nations who are not bound by the provisions of
the Antarctic Treaty or the Protocol from placing oil rigs off the region's
coast.147 The nations who are not bound are numerous. These nations
could simply argue that by not being a member of the Protocol, they are
not legally bound to preserve Antarctica's environment, and therefore
may commence drilling at any time. 48 In addition, as mentioned, the
discharges of oily substances are needed to combat other pollution incidents, then they
are permitted. Id. art. 3, para. 2(b).
140. Id. article l(b) defines "garbage" as: "all kinds of victual, domestic and opera-
tional waste excluding fresh fish and parts thereof, generated during the normal operation
of the ship, except those substances which are covered by Articles 3 and 4."
141. Id. art. 5. Prohibited items include: "all plastics, including but not limited to
synthetic ropes, synthetic fishing nets, and plastic garbage bags." Id. art. 5, para. 1. In
addition, "paper products, rags, glass, metal, bottles, crockery, incineration ash, dunnage,
lining and packing materials," will also be prohibited. Id. art. 5, para. 2. The provisions
of paragraphs one and two will not apply if the ship has been damaged and all reasonable
precautions have been taken to minimize the damage, or there has been an accidental loss
of synthetic fishing nets. Id. art. 5, para. 5. In addition, under article 6, each Party will
to the best of its ability, eliminate all discharges of untreated sewage that occur within
twelve nautical miles of land or ice shelves. Id. art. 6, para. l(a).
142. Id. art. 12.
143. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
144. Id. Parties are now also required to cooperate in the formulating and implement-
ing of such plans, and to seek the advice of various maritime and international organiza-
tions in their endeavors. Id. art. 12, para. 1(a)(b).
145. See Bowermaster, supra note 115.
146. Various reports maintain that cobalt, chromium, manganese, uranium, platinum,
coal, iron, molybdenum, gold, nickel, and diamonds lie beneath Antarctica's layers of ice.
For a discussion of the current knowledge of mineral wealth in Antarctica, see SHAPLEY,
supra note 19, at 134-45.
147. Bowermaster, supra note 115.
148. Id.
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Protocol's walkout clause could subject the continent and surrounding
area to mineral exploitation after five years notice.' 49 Furthermore, the
issue of liability, should an environmental accident occur by the fault of
one of the Parties, is dealt with vaguely in the Protocol, whereby "the
Parties undertake to elaborate rules and procedures relating to liability
for damage arising from the activities taking place in the Antarctic
Treaty area and covered by this Protocol."'' 50
The Protocol is to be in effect for at least the next fifty years. 151 Cer-
tainly its biggest test will be whether it can survive the interpretations of
a world that may one day need to call upon Antarctica to provide future
energy and resource materials. Diplomats "must continue to pay close
attention in coming years. If they don't, they risk waking to find, say,
Pakistani (or Moroccan or Soviet or American) oil rigs littering the
coastline of the seventh continent, defeating the strenuous international
effort to keep it laboratory-clean."' 52
CONCLUSION
Since the inception of the Antarctic Treaty, the environment has been
of primary concern. The recent agreement to adopt an environmental
Protocol which includes a fifty year mining moratorium for the Antarctic
Treaty area represents a milestone. Nations have finally realized that the
region is one that is not fully understood, and that until we acquire a
reasonably strong comprehension of the impact that man's activities on
the continent might have, we should do very little to disrupt that which
we do not yet know. The agreement, however, contains weaknesses and
allows nations to withdraw from the moratorium after sufficient notice is
given. As a result, the Parties must not permit the establishment of this
Protocol and moratorium to lull them into complacency. Instead, they
should begin formulating a minerals regime that will satisfy both the re-
gion's environmental concerns and the world's needs for resources.
While proposals of keeping Antarctica a natural reserve and world park
are noble aspirations, they are not realistic. Should the time come when
nations need to tap into the possible wealth that Antarctica may have to
offer, they will. It then becomes the Parties' prime responsibility to de-
cide how best to divide that wealth and preserve Antarctica's unique en-
149. Id.
150. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 16. The Parties did, however, express that an elabora-
tion of the rules and procedures relating to liability for damage arising from activities
taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area should commence at an early stage. In this
context, it was understood that liability for damage to the Antarctic environment should
be included in such an elaboration. See Protocol supra note 4, at 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1460.
151. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 25, para. 2. This provision states that:
If, after the expiration of 50 years from the date of entry into force of this
Protocol, any of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties so requests by a com-
munication addressed to the Depositary, a conference shall be held as soon as
practicable to review the operation of this Protocol.
152. Bowermaster, supra note 115.
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vironment at the same time. The Protocol and the mining moratorium
represent a crowning diplomatic achievement; however, more will clearly
need to be done.
Andrew F Neuman
